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THE EROSION OF PUBLISHER LIABILITY
IN AMERICAN LAW, SECTION 230, AND THE
FUTURE OF ONLINE CURATION
BRENT SKORUP* & JENNIFER HUDDLESTON**
Abstract
As internet businesses started to emerge in the 1990s, online content
distributors were taken to court for material they published or republished.
While the court in Cubby v. CompuServe found that the internet-based
company was not liable, another court arrived at the opposite conclusion in
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. Congress resolved the ambiguity by enacting
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, of which § 230 established a
broad liability shield for online content distributors. Two decades later, §
230 has come under scrutiny, and many critics and lawmakers characterize
it as a drastic deviation from common law that requires correction.
However, an examination of the relevant case law reveals that courts had
instead narrowed liability for publishers, republishers, and distributors for
decades—eventually culminating in the Cubby decision. Section 230, we
suggest, codified this process by establishing a publisher liability regime
that likely would have emerged in common law. Based on this legal history,
we discuss the circumstances under which mandated online content
takedown could be prudent and practicable as well as those under which
continuing § 230 protections may prove necessary.
Introduction
We are more than two decades into the era of “cheap speech.”1 The
relatively limited media world of newspapers, pamphlets, and three
broadcast networks has given way to media abundance from cable and
satellite television and—most significantly—internet distribution. Online
content distributors (who act as “intermediaries” between content producers
and consumers by providing a platform for content without actually
creating it) such as social media sites, app stores, search engines, and
* J.D., George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Wheaton College; Senior
Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.
** J.D., University of Alabama School of Law; B.A., Wellesley College; Research
Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.
1. See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J.
1805 (1995).
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internet service providers (ISPs) often use intentional, semi-automated, and
iterative processes to decide what content to omit and transmit.
Consequently, as media theorist Clay Shirky notes, the centuries-old
formula of “Filter-then-publish,” has been reversed in the internet age:
“[P]ublish-then-filter.”2 This rapid shift in editing from “selection” to
“curation” puts immense stress on traditional publication law and liability.
To expressly protect online content distributors from punitive liability
lawsuits over users’ posts, Congress created a broad liability shield in
section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act. In recent years, this
liability shield has come under scrutiny from lawmakers and advocates
across the political spectrum. One primary criticism is that § 230 is a radical
departure from traditional publication law. This legal reversal, critics say,
makes harassing or antisocial behavior profitable and leads tech companies
to discriminate against political opponents or censure unpopular
viewpoints. Their proposed solutions often involve repealing § 230 or
narrowing its coverage to increase the liability of online content distributors
for users’ behavior and content. 3
This Article explores the debate over online content distributors’
liability. In particular, it draws on decades of legal trends and defamation
cases to show that § 230 is not the deviation from common-law liability that
it is often characterized as. Courts rarely recognize strict liability for
distribution of defamatory content.4 In fact, many courts have recognized
and endorsed “conduit liability” and the related “wire service defense,”
which represent powerful protections for newspapers, cable operators, and
broadcasters.

2. CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY : THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 81, 98 (2008). This is of course a simplification of the actual process of
content moderation that often engages in multiple rounds of publication and filtering for
various content.
3. See, e.g., Press Release, Josh Hawley, Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to
Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech Companies (June 19, 2019), https://www.
hawley.senate.gov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-bigtech-companies.
4. See Lewis v. Time Inc., 83 F.R.D. 455, 463 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (“The common thread
in these cases is that there can be no liability absent scienter. The requirement of
scienter comports with the traditional rule that a republisher cannot be held liable unless he
had knowledge of the defamatory content, and satisfies the federal constitutional rule against
liability without fault.”) (citation omitted).
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Second, much like the Supreme Court “constitutionalized” defamation
law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 which protected direct publishers
from liability, First Amendment considerations would likely lead courts to a
§ 230-like liability protection for republishers such as online distributors—
even in the absence of the law.6 While a conduit liability regime would
have gradually emerged for online content distributors in the absence of §
230, we conclude the law had—and continues to have—a salutary effect on
the development of online services. Section 230 protected the nascent
internet industry at a critical time, and a top-to-bottom reformulation today
would impose significant transition costs as courts develop an appropriate
liability regime.
Part I introduces cases in which courts limited strict liability for tortious
content distribution by media distributors in the decades before § 230’s
implementation. This history suggests that the codification of broad
publisher liability in § 230 simply accelerated the prevailing trend in
common law. Part II describes the two cases that prompted Congress to
enact § 230, as well as subsequent cases that further shaped the liability of
online content distributors. Part II closes by documenting the increasing
public pressure to repeal or modify § 230. Finally, Part III discusses the
circumstances in which statutory departures from both § 230 and conduit
liability would be prudent and practicable while preserving free expression
online.
I. The Erosion of Publisher and Distributor Liability
A popular view states that § 230 “upended a set of principles enshrined
in common law doctrines” developed for the offline world.7 The notion

5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J.
Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825, 825 (1984).
6. See, e.g., Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027,
2032–36 (2018) (arguing that “imposing defamation liability on internet intermediaries is
unconstitutional” because of the collateral censorship) [hereinafter Note, Section 230 as
First Amendment Rule].
7. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 373, 411 (2010); see also Mike Masnick, Nancy Pelosi Joins Ted Cruz and
Louis Gohmert in Attacking CDA 230, TECHDIRT (Apr. 12, 2019, 9:42 AM), https://www.
techdirt.com/articles/20190411/18521741986/nancy-pelosi-joins-ted-cruz-louis-gohmertattacking-cda-230.shtml (quoting House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s characterization of § 230 as
“a gift” to tech companies).
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that, absent § 230, online platforms would be “liable like the rest of us” 8 is
a common one that reflects the traditional view of publisher liability. 9
Traditionally, as with other torts,10 publishers were often held strictly liable
for the content they published, even if they did not know that a given
statement was defamatory or otherwise tortious. 11 However, courts began
eroding this traditional strict liability regime more than six decades before §
230 was enacted in 1996.12
This Part traces that legal development away from strict liability, and
toward fault-based liability, not just for online intermediaries but, more
generally, for distributors and publishers. Before § 230 was passed, courts
granted even non-common carriers and media outlets broad liability
protection for content they republished or transmitted. 13

8. Mark Sullivan, The 1996 Law That Made the Web Is in the Crosshairs, FAST CO.
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/maybe-its-time-to-take-away-theoutdated-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits (quoting Senator Ted Cruz).
9. Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“In the
absence of the protection afforded by section 230(c)(1), one who published or distributed
speech online ‘could be held liable for defamation even if he or she was not the author of
defamatory text, and . . . at least with regard to publishers, even if unaware of the
statement.’”) (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003)).
10. LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS 28 (1941).
11. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: “Fault” or Strict Liability?,
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 252, 254 (1954) (“The law of libel and slander . . . . is ordinarily thought of
as a body of law grounded on ‘absolute liability.’”). In the early formation of the law, as far
back as pre-Norman England, as one commentator puts it, “There is no doubt that all of the
liability in those days was absolute liability.” ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 28.
12. Today, even an online “book publisher” will be found not liable for the content of
published material if that publisher has only a “minute level of involvement with the author
of the alleged defamatory material.” Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 187, 194 (D.
Me. 2008). We’re grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making note of this case.
13. Our analysis focuses on liability for distribution of defamatory and libelous
materials, but negligence and fault-based liability also undermined strict liability for
copyright infringement. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (acknowledging that the copyright
statutes impose strict liability but declining to hold an internet access provider liable for the
copying and distribution of copyrighted content); see also Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright
Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 305, 309 (2015) (“Copyright
infringement, according to most judges and commentators, is a strict liability tort.”). But see
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (granting partial
summary judgment for plaintiff where defendant online bulletin board operator distributed
plaintiff’s copyrighted content).
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Under the traditional legal standard, “every repetition of a defamatory
statement is considered a publication,” 14 and republishers were as liable as
the original author.15 The first Restatement of Torts articulated this
traditional strict liability rule. 16 “Publisher” was interpreted broadly, and
courts that hewed to this traditional view held liable bulletin board
owners,17 business partners of a publisher,18 and even tavern owners who
tolerated defamatory writing on the walls. 19
Over time, however, many courts held that a republisher was more like a
distributor and therefore could not be held liable for content others created
absent a showing of fault.20 A sliding scale for liability developed, based on
the degree to which the transmitter or publisher edited the statement. Courts
have even recognized liability protection for “wire service liability” or
“conduit liability” to non-common carriers like broadcasters and print
publications.21 Two considerations drive liability protection for distributors
and publishers: a desire for practical legal rules and free speech norms.
14. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 799 (5th ed. 1984)).
15. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 95 (1992); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332;
see, e.g., Leflar, supra note 11, at 254 (“The law of libel and slander . . . . is ordinarily
thought of as a body of law grounded on ‘absolute liability.’”). Such standards apply widely
not only to standard reporting but also to opinion pieces and even fictional works. See
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–21 (1990); John Preston, The Murky World
of Literary Libel, TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2013, 7:00 AM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/culture/books/booknews/10172292/The-murky-world-of-literary-libel.html.
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: INTENTION § 580 (AM. LAW INST . 1938); see also
ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 51 (“The nature of liability for defamation is set forth in
Section 580 of the Restatement of Torts where it definitely imposes an absolute liability.”).
17. Fogg v. Bos. & L.R. Co., 20 N.E. 109, 110 (Mass. 1889) (holding defendant railroad
that published defamatory statement by placing it on company bulletin board liable).
18. Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 17 N.W. 387, 388 (Minn. 1883) (“If he authorized,
incited, or encouraged any person to do it; or if, having authority to forbid it, he permitted it;
or, having authority to remove them, he allowed them to remain,-the act was his.”).
19. Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757, 759 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (“The theory is that
by knowingly permitting such matter to remain after reasonable opportunity to remove the
same the owner of the wall . . . is guilty of republication of the libel.”) (emphasis added).
20. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. State Med. Ass’n Found., 264
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (requiring that republisher either knew or should have
known of defamatory nature of the statements transmitted protects libraries and vendors of
books, magazines, and newspapers).
21. Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 930–931 (E.D. Wash. 1992)
(recognizing conduit liability for a broadcast TV station); Church of Scientology, 264
N.W.2d at 156 (holding that a medical association magazine was a conduit, protected from a
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A. Practical Considerations Limiting Publisher and Distributor Liability
Even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the emerging law of
negligence was undercutting strict liability for torts.22 The erosion of strict
liability was premised on practical considerations and potential for
economic harm.23 More specifically, commentators recognize that there was
a desire to give these new-medium publishers more leeway in a growing
industry.24 This negligence law trend away from strict liability was then
extended to defamation publication and republication lawsuits.
1. The Wire Service Defense
With the emergence of news services like the Associated Press during
the telegraph era, courts recognized that earlier liability theories for
republication required modification.25 For instance, in the seminal 1933
case of Layne v. Tribune Co., the Florida Supreme Court declined to hold a
newspaper strictly liable for republishing a defamatory dispatch from a
news service. 26 Later cases regarded Layne as creating the “wire service
defense.”27 The court held that a paper is only liable if “the publisher . . .
defamation suit); Van Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105,
112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (granting wire service defense to newspaper journalists who relied
on statements from jail personnel).
22. See ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 32 (“There is practically no law of negligence prior
to the nineteenth century. The greatest development has been since 1875.”); see also Summit
Hotel Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302, 304 (Pa. 1939).
23. One motivation of this legal development was that strict liability was too punitive to
young industries. Scholars like Professor Laurence H. Eldredge tied the growth of
negligence legal theories to the need to protect “infant industries” and the development of an
industrial sector. ELDREDGE, supra note 10, at 32 (“Another aspect of the developing
negligence law, was the thought that undue burdens should not stifle infant industries, so that
any theory of absolute liability was deemed inconsistent with this developing industrial
community.”).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933) (“[C]ourts can, and
must, take judicial notice of the fact that in printing an associated press, or other press
service dispatch, of a purported news happening, emanating from other places or localities,
the article or news item, as reproduced and published locally, is not considered as the
original or voluntary composition of the newspaper publisher, who merely reproduces it in
his daily news columns in the form in which it has been received, but is rather regarded by
the public as a mere repetition of a publication that has already been made by its real authors
in their course of disseminating the news.”).
26. Id. at 238–39.
27. See, e.g., Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1476–77 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (holding that Newsweek magazine was entitled to the wire service defense);
MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 119 So. 2d 85, 86–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960);
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acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in reproducing” the
story.28 The court grounded this holding in the practical and economic
realities of distributing the news and the public need for efficient, low-cost
delivery of news:
No newspaper could afford to warrant the absolute authenticity
of every item of its news, nor assume in advance the burden of
specially verifying every item of news reported to it by
established news gathering agencies, and continue to discharge
with efficiency and promptness the demands of modern
necessity for prompt publication, if publication is to be had at
all.29
The Layne court also drew upon earlier legal principles when excusing the
newspaper of liability under this defense:
Those are numerous authorities, most of them of early date,
which are to the effect that one who hears a slander has a legal
right to repeat it, if he does so in the same words, and at the same
time gives his authority for the statement, because of the rebuttal
of any presumption of malice in such cases. 30
The Layne decision and its “practicality argument” gained prominence as
mass media and broadcast developed. According to contemporary accounts,
within the first few decades of TV and radio, legal commentators were
evenly split as to whether strict liability should apply to broadcasters, or
whether they were more analogous to “disseminators” like bookstores,
newsstands, and libraries, where fault was needed to impose liability. 31
Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 725–26 (Mass. 1985); accord
Rakofsky v. Wash. Post, No. 105573/11, 2013 WL 1975654, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 29,
2013) (recognizing wire service defense for a plaintiff who published summaries of news
stories).
28. Layne, 146 So. at 238.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id. at 237 (citing Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. (Ala.) 442 (Ala. 1836); Johnson v. St.
Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539 (Mo. 1877)).
31. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 145–46 (N.J. 1948) (“There are two
schools of thought as to the act of publishing the defamatory statement by the broadcasting
medium—one of so-called absolute liability . . . and the other of liability based upon
negligence . . . .”) (citing Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82, 83 (Neb. 1932); Summit Hotel
Co. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 8 A.2d 302 (Pa. 1939)); Leflar, supra note 11, at 257 n.22 (citing
cases on both sides of the dispute). The first Restatement of Torts acknowledged the
broadcast issue but refused to take a position on it. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: WHAT
CONSTITUTES PUBLICATION § 577 (caveat) (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (“The Institute expresses
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2. Other Republication Defenses
Buttressed by state laws,32 Layne precipitated a trend away from the
traditional view of strict publisher liability in the context of republication.
For instance, only two years after Layne, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
announced a similar negligence rule for radio broadcast, citing the practical
burdens of strict liability.33 In Summit Hotel Co. v. NBC, a Pennsylvania
hotel brought a defamation lawsuit against radio broadcaster, NBC, in state
court.34 It did so after the host on one of NBC’s sponsored programs
extemporaneously remarked to an interview guest that a certain hotel was
“a rotten hotel.”35 The lower court instructed the jury that the statement was
slanderous per se and held NBC liable. 36
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and created a new
tort: radio defamation. 37 This new tort deviated from strict liability for
publishers of libel or slander and created a negligence standard. The court
held that a broadcaster that leases airtime cannot be held liable for an
impromptu defamatory statement if the broadcaster exercised due care in
selecting the lessee, as “there was no possible way in which [NBC] could
have anticipated or prevented the remark.” 38
Like the Layne court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited the
economic difficulties that would result if strict liability were imposed: “A
rule should be applied which will not impose too heavy a burden on the
industry, and yet will secure a high measure of protection to the public or
those who may be injured.”39 The court also discussed the fact that
publication law was trending away from strict liability and toward a
negligence standard.40
no opinion as to whether the proprietors of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from
liability for a defamatory broadcast by a person not in their employ if they could not have
prevented the publication by the exercise of reasonable care, or whether, as an original
publisher, they are liable irrespective of the precautions taken to prevent the defamatory
publication.”); see also id. § 581 cmt. f.
32. See Leflar, supra note 11, at 267–71.
33. Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d at 310–11.
34. Id. at 303.
35. Id. at 303 n.1.
36. Id. at 303.
37. Id. at 312; Leflar, supra note 11, at 262.
38. Summit Hotel, 8 A.2d at 312.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. at 304 (“A tort today implies fault or wrong. Tort liability must be founded upon
some blameworthy conduct, or lack of due care resulting in the violation of a duty owing to
others.”); see also Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143, 147 (N.J. 1948) (finding that broadcasters

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/4

2020]

EROSION OF PUBLISHER LIABILITY IN AMERICAN LAW 643

Fifteen years after Layne, a legal commentator noted that “the current
trend is strongly away from strict liabilty [sic] as the governing rule in the
field of radio and television defamation.” 41 A national campaign by
broadcasters in the early 1950s led most states to pass laws that eliminated
strict liability for on-air defamation42 and typically absolved broadcasters
from liability if they exercised due care. 43 This legal trend and these statutes
proved to be quite useful at limiting costly litigation over rebroadcasts of
tortious material; in fact, decades later, a federal court failed to find any
case law interpreting these state broadcaster liability laws.44
3. The Expansion of the Wire Service Defense to Speakers
Other state and federal courts recognize a wire service defense that is
broader than the rule in Layne—one that is not limited to republishing wire
services and news outlets. 45 The republication defense in Minnesota, New
York, North Carolina, Georgia, and other states, for instance, is not limited
to wire services when the original source relied on is apparent.46 The
Massachusetts Appeals Court justified the wire service defense’s broader
coverage in the following way: “It would pose an impermissible
burden upon the media and the courts to force them to make subtle
are “disseminators”—thus no absolute liability—and must exercise reasonable care to avoid
liability for on-air defamatory statements).
41. Leflar, supra note 11, at 267.
42. Id. at 267–71.
43. Id. at 267–70. Judge Learned Hand defined due care in this way: “The degree of
care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that
his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.” Conway v. O’Brien,
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
44. Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 927 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
45. See, e.g., Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (“The New York rule, on its face, is not so limited [as Layne] and, indeed, has been
applied in a number of cases where the republished material was originally published by a
source other than a wire service.”).
46. Chaiken v. VV Pub’g Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1032 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the
defense where the original source was a noncontract writer for the Village Voice with a
“sound reputation”); Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn. State Med. Ass’n Found., 264
N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (holding that a medical association magazine was a conduit,
protected from a defamation suit); Jewell, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71; McKinney v. Avery
Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295, 297–98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (granting wire service defense to
a journalist who relied on daily newspapers for a story in addition to wire services); Van
Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105, 112 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989) (granting wire service defense to newspaper journalists who relied on statements from
jail personnel); see also Cole v. Star Tribune, 581 N.W.2d 364, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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distinctions between published material that must be independently verified
and that which does not.”47
Even speakers—those who curate and edit content 48—could avail
themselves of the “wire service defense” in the publication of defamatory
content. For instance, in Nelson v. Associated Press, a professional psychic
brought a defamation lawsuit against several media outlets, including
Newsweek, for publishing damaging stories about her business. 49 But the
Newsweek story at issue was not a wire service story. Rather, the magazine
had contracted with and published a story from a journalist who had written
an original story based on defamatory statements in wire service and news
reports.50 Despite the fact this was an original story, not a “mere
reproduction” like the one at issue in Layne,51 the court held that Newsweek
was protected by the wire service defense to libel. 52 The protections within
the wire service defense expanded and the doctrine grew to encompass the
new, developing media outlets.
4. Conduit Liability for Mass Media
The wire service defense was later extended to television stations with
the ability to edit, curate, and terminate programs. 53 As the defense was
applied to new types of media publishers, it was renamed “conduit
liability”—akin to the liability of common carriers such as telephone and
telegraph operators.54 However, courts very rarely impose liability on
47. Reilly v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204, 1217 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
48. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (finding
that “exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its
repertoire” is speech by cable operators).
49. Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
50. Id.
51. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 237 (Fla. 1933).
52. Nelson, 667 F. Supp. at 1476–77. This case bears close resemblance to the
circumstances in Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court dismissed a defamation case against
AOL, despite the fact that AOL had commissioned the underlying story. 992 F. Supp. 44,
51–53 (D.D.C. 1998).
53. See Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 2002 WL
475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (extending wire service defense to a TV station).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PROVIDING MEANS OF PUBLICATION § 612 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). According to the Restatement,
A public utility under a duty to transmit messages is privileged to do so, even
though it knows the message to be false and defamatory, unless
(a) the sender of the message is not privileged to send it, and
(b) the agent who transmits the message knows or has reason to know that
the sender is not privileged to publish it.
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conduits, even when the conduit operator has knowledge that tortious
material is being transmitted.55 As one scholar puts it, “In practical terms,
conduits almost never face liability for third-party speech.”56 Though it has
traditionally been reserved for common carriers, courts have applied
conduit liability to non-common carriers such as broadcasters and internet
bulletin boards.57 As courts have recognized in other TV programming
cases, so long as TV broadcasters have “absolute non-involvement with the
underlying broadcast,” they can avail themselves of the conduit defense to
liability.58 Complaints against conduits are typically dismissed at the
summary judgment stage.59
In the 1992 Washington State case of Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, a class of
4700 apple growers alleged defamation against three local CBS affiliates
for running a 60 Minutes program about chemicals being used in the applegrowing industry. 60 As in Layne and its progeny, the court declined to
impose liability because of the burden it would impose on outlets. 61 The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ theory, if accepted, would have the
following effect:
[It] would force the creation of full time editorial boards at local
stations throughout the country which possess sufficient
knowledge, legal acumen and access to experts to continually
monitor incoming transmissions and exercise on-the-spot
discretionary calls or face $75 million dollar lawsuits at every
turn. That is not realistic. 62
Id. § 612(2).
55. Id.; see also Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974) (finding
telephone company not liable for a recorded defamatory answering machine message even
when the company knew about the defamatory message).
56. Ardia, supra note 7, at 400 (citing Anderson, 320 N.E.2d at 649).
57. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492
(D. Ariz. 1996); Merco Joint Venture v. Kaufman, 923 F. Supp. 924, 929–30 (W.D. Tex.
1996); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes,” 800 F. Supp. 928, 930–31 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Lunney v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999); see also Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell
Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 2002 WL 475193, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (extending
wire service defense to a TV station).
58. Med. Lab., 931 F. Supp. at 1492; see also Merco, 923 F. Supp. at 929–30
(recognizing conduit liability in granting summary judgment to defendant TV station for
broadcasting a program with defamatory content).
59. See, e.g., Merco, 923 F. Supp. at 929–30.
60. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 930–31.
61. Id. at 931–32.
62. Id. at 931.
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Critically, the court recognized that the CBS affiliates “had the power to”
exercise editorial control over the broadcast and “in fact occasionally [did]
censor programming . . . for one reason or another” when the affiliate
“believe[d] the content unsuitable for local consumption.” 63 Despite having
the power to edit the underlying content and occasionally exercising that
editorial control over content, media companies (like broadcasters) are still
subject to mere “conduit liability.”64
B. First Amendment Considerations Limiting Publisher and Distributor
Liability
Concern for practicality was not the only factor in the erosion of strict
liability for republishers and the move toward distributor and, in some
cases, conduit liability. Courts also expanded legal protection of
intermediaries and publishers on First Amendment grounds, because
liability chilled the free exchange of ideas and criticism.65
This “constitutionalizing” of defamation and republication law occurred
in the latter half of the twentieth century. As Leflar noted in 1954, amid the
rise of broadcast radio and TV, even broadcaster liability could chill
speech:
If, however, no amount of care could guard against the
threatened harm, the preventive significance [of negligence
liability] is lessened; it is limited to the possibility of foregoing
the dangerous activity altogether. When the dangerous activity is
the dissemination of ideas and information, and the effect in
practice of foregoing it would be that certain speakers might be
cut off the air altogther [sic], thus barring legitimate speech in
order to take no chances on the possibility of something
63. Id. Courts also recognize free speech norms in § 230 cases. See Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 29 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622 (2017)
(noting that “First Amendment values . . . drive” § 230’s creation).
64. Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 931–32. Similarly, a federal district court recognized the wire
service defense to the Associated Press (AP), even though the AP made edits before
transmitting a defamatory story. Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575, 577, 579–80
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
65. Ardia, supra note 7, at 401–06. Eric Goldman makes a compelling case for why §
230 is superior to common law and constitutional protection of online providers. Eric
Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
REFLECTION 33 (2019). However, many of his points deal with the increased liability
providers would face under distributor liability (scienter, commercial speech, constitutional
avoidance, etc.). Id. at 36–39. Conduit liability is more protective than distributor liability
and resembles § 230 in that nearly every complaint can be dismissed. Id. at 39–42.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss3/4

2020]

EROSION OF PUBLISHER LIABILITY IN AMERICAN LAW 647

illegitimate being said, the virtue of this pressure toward
prevention fades rapidly and almost disappears.66
This liability protection for media intermediaries emerged because the
difficulty in determining the lawfulness of contributors’ speech created
practical concerns, and broad application of strict liability threatened to
produce a chilling effect on speech. In 1959, in Farmers Educational &
Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a
broadcaster was immune from liability for defamation made by a political
candidate on the air:
Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether such
a statement is actionably libelous is an even more complex
question, involving as it does, consideration of various legal
defenses . . . . Quite possibly, if a station were held responsible
for the broadcast of libelous material, all remarks even faintly
objectionable would be excluded out of an excess of caution. 67
That same year, in Smith v. California, the Supreme Court held that
imposing strict liability for obscene materials in bookstores is
unconstitutional because doing so would deprive the public of protected
material. 68 Recognizing the deleterious effect a strict liability standard
could have, the Court reasoned, “If the contents of bookshops and
periodical stands were restricted to material of which their proprietors had
made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed.”69
The Supreme Court continued this trend in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day.70 In 1962, the Court held that the publisher of an erotic homosexual
magazine was not civilly liable for “obscene advertising” under the
Comstock Act when it published and distributed ads for companies that
were being prosecuted for distributing obscene material. 71 The Court relied
on both the practicality and free speech justifications for striking down the
law:
Since publishers cannot practicably be expected to investigate
each of their advertisers, and since the economic consequences
of an order barring even a single issue of a periodical from the
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Leflar, supra note 11, at 265.
360 U.S. 525, 530–31 (1959).
361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
Id.
370 U.S. 478 (1962).
Id. at 491–95.
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mails might entail heavy financial sacrifice, a magazine
publisher might refrain from accepting advertisements from
those whose own materials could conceivably be deemed
objectionable by the Post Office Department. This would deprive
such materials, which might otherwise be entitled to
constitutional protection, of a legitimate and recognized avenue
of access to the public. 72
Two years later, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
decided the first of what has come to be known as “media defendant” cases,
which protect robust and uninhibited public communication. 73 To prevail on
defamation claims under the fault-based approach, public officials and
public figures must prove that defendants acted with “actual malice.” 74 In
later cases, the Court expanded the fault requirement to cases involving
non-media defendants 75 and even private plaintiffs. 76
The First Amendment has also been cited for the recognition of the wire
service defense in mass media. In Medical Laboratory Management
Consultants v. ABC, the co-owner of a medical testing facility sued the
local broadcast station for airing an allegedly defamatory story. 77 The
federal district court cited the wire service defense’s First Amendment
purposes in holding that that the defendant—operating as a “mere conduit”
that did not in any way contribute to producing the story—could avail itself
of the defense. 78 In short, laws that effectively require distributors and
republishers to follow impractical content moderation practices contravene
these trends in First Amendment jurisprudence.

72. Id. at 493.
73. 376 U.S. 254, 270, 282 (1964); see Gerald R. Smith, Of Malice and Men: The Law
of Defamation, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (1992).
74. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 283–84.
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762–63 (1985)
(credit reporting agency).
76. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346–47 (1974). A private-figure
plaintiff, operating under the prevailing negligence standard, need only show that the
republisher’s effort is less than reasonable. See, e.g., Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 771 P.2d
406, 424–25, 430 (Cal. 1989).
77. 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1489 (D. Ariz. 1996).
78. Id. at 1492 (“The wire service defense is consistent with modern First Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
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II. Section 230 and the Creation of Modern Internet Law

Under the traditional view of publisher liability, publishers are presumed
to know the content of materials that they publish, and they can therefore be
held strictly liable for tort violations such as libel and defamation79 or
copyright violations. 80 As recently as the 1990s, legal scholars still debated
whether the publication liability of internet intermediaries resembled that of
“print publishers, broadcasters, bookstores, libraries, physical bulletin board
operators, [or] common carriers.”81 Section 230 brought some certainty to
that debate and extended liability protection that resembles the conduit
liability scheme for common carriers.
A. Divergent Liability Regimes for the Early Internet
In the 1990s, two New York courts—one federal and one state—
encountered the same question: are online intermediaries liable for
defamatory content posted by their users? The courts arrived at divergent
opinions, and before other courts could develop a consensus on the issue in
a common-law manner, Congress intervened to deliver legal certainty to
young internet companies and the broader World Wide Web.
In Cubby v. CompuServe, a 1991 federal case, the developers of a
computer database sued CompuServe for libel—the publication of
defamatory statements. 82 CompuServe operated as a host for many internet
forums and bulletin boards, and a user denigrated the plaintiffs’ business
practices on one of CompuServe’s gossip forums. 83 CompuServe moved for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that it was a distributor
(and not a publisher) of the statements. 84 The court agreed that CompuServe
was a distributor and granted summary judgment in its favor because

79. Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60–61 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Smith
v. Utley, 65 N.W. 744, 746 (Wis. 1896) (holding managing editor of newspaper liable for
publication of libelous article whether or not he actually knew of publication because matter
was constructively under editor’s supervision).
80. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198–99 (1931) (holding that
copyright infringement is a strict liability tort).
81. Kean J. DeCarlo, Note, Tilting at Windmills: Defamation and the Private Person in
Cyberspace, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (1997). Even these analogues cannot answer the
question of liability exposure for internet intermediaries, as there was an additional sliding
scale of liability for distributors of content, based on the amount of curation and editorial
control the intermediary exercised. Id. at 552.
82. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
83. Id. at 137–38.
84. Id.
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CompuServe “neither knew nor had reason to know of the allegedly
defamatory . . . statements.”85
Though the facts in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., an
unpublished decision from a New York state court in 1995, closely
mirrored those in Cubby, the court reached a very different conclusion. 86 In
Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment banking firm sued Prodigy, an
online operator of bulletin boards and forums, for publishing a forum user’s
libelous statements.87 The court distinguished the case from Cubby on the
grounds that Prodigy exercised more editorial control of user posts than
CompuServe exercised at the time of Cubby.88 The court held that Prodigy
was liable for users’ content because the Prodigy operators engaged in
moderation of user content, which equated to the company exercising
editorial control.89
After Stratton Oakmont, online companies faced two undesirable options
for limiting their liability for users’ content: (1) engage in costly, constant
monitoring of user content and take down questionable content; or (2)
abandon all editorial control, like a common carrier, and leave all content
online, no matter how offensive.
Congress resolved this dilemma in 1996 when it passed the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). Though the CDA was originally
developed as an attempt to protect children by limiting access to
pornography and obscene material online, 90 two Representatives proposed
an amendment to the CDA in direct response to concerns that Stratton
Oakmont threatened to cripple then-nascent internet technology. 91 The
amendment was incorporated into the CDA during conference, passed as
85. Id. at 141.
86. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., Index No. 031063/94, 23 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by
statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230, as recognized in Shiamil v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952
N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
87. Id. at 1794–95, 1995 WL 323710, at *1–2.
88. Id. at 1797, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. However, Prodigy’s general counsel flatly
denies that they were screening postings: Prodigy merely had software that blocked posts
containing one of the “seven dirty words.” Marc Jacobson, Prodigy: It May Be Many Things
to Many People, but, It Is Not a Publisher for Purposes of Libel, and Other Opinions, 11 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 673, 676–77 (1996).
89. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. at 1798, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
90. See Steven Levy, No Place for Kids?, NEWSWEEK (July 2, 1995, 8:00 PM EDT),
http://www.newsweek.com/no-place-kids-184766.
91. CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Dec. 10, 2019).
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part of the larger 1996 Telecommunications Act, and eventually codified in
§ 230.92
Section 230 was distinct from the anti-indecency regulatory framework
underlying the rest of the CDA. First, § 230 announced a national policy to
“encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on
the Internet.”93 Second, § 230’s drafters sought to establish a system
whereby online service providers would develop and enforce their own
standards while allowing consumers to select the appropriate standards for
their needs.94 Therefore, § 230 granted civil immunity to internet
intermediaries for the content that users generate so long as they notify
users of available parental control options. 95 Critically, the law expressly
established that internet intermediaries should not “be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by” a third party; 96
generally, only content creators are exposed to liability.
B. Broad Coverage of Section 230 Liability Protection
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court struck down nearly all of the CDA
as content-based restrictions on speech that violated the First Amendment
but left § 230 liability protection untouched. 97 Despite surviving, § 230
faced numerous challenges in the years that followed. But courts interpreted
the liability protection broadly and thus allowed online moderation
standards to develop.
1. Defamation
The first major challenge to § 230 liability protection came in Zeran v.
America Online, Inc. in 1997.98 A prankster, who posed as a man named
Kenneth Zeran99 on an America Online (AOL)-affiliated message board,
advertised products with tasteless slogans about the Oklahoma City
92. See id.
93. Id. (quoting Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)).
94. Id.
95. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), (d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
96. Id. § 230(c)(1). As discussed below, the law also required compliance with relevant
federal criminal laws, such as those governing child pornography, sex trafficking, and
copyright law. Id. § 230(e).
97. See 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
98. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
99. Kenneth Zeran operated a business in Seattle, Washington at the time the prankster
uploaded the postings. See id. at 329; see also Steven M. Cordero, Comment, Damnum
Absque Injuria: Zeran v. AOL and Cyberspace Defamation Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 775, 776 (1999).
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bombing.100 The imposter posted Zeran’s phone number for interested
buyers, and Zeran soon began receiving media attention as well as
harassing and threatening phone calls. 101 Zeran contacted AOL to request
that the posts be removed, but over the next few days more posts appeared,
and the harassment continued.102 Zeran filed suit against AOL, arguing that
while § 230 immunized AOL from publisher liability, the law did not
immunize AOL from distributor liability.103
After losing in federal district court,104 Zeran appealed the decision to the
Fourth Circuit.105 The Fourth Circuit found that § 230 protected AOL from
distributor liability because its purpose was to “create[] a federal immunity
to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for
information originating with a third-party user of the service,” in order “to
maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to
keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.” 106 The court
held that distributor liability “is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher
liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”107
2. Product Authentication
The CDA text did not limit § 230 liability protection to defamation
claims, and courts afforded intermediaries immunity from other types of
liability associated with user-generated content. For instance, in Gentry v.
eBay, Inc., a California state court found that § 230 liability protection
protected the auction website from liability for failing to authenticate
autographed sports and entertainment memorabilia. 108 Because the website
did not create the descriptions of the items, select the categories they were
placed in, or confirm or deny the authenticity of such items, it could not be
held liable for the actions of third-party sellers regarding the authenticity of
the memorabilia.109

100. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 330–31.
104. Id. at 328 (“The district court granted judgment for AOL on the grounds that the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) bars Zeran’s claims.”) (citation omitted).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 330.
107. Id. at 332.
108. See Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 716 (Ct. App. 2002).
109. Id.
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3. Bad Actors on Social Networks
Early social networking sites also quickly became involved in debates
over where to draw the line between intermediary and content creator. In
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., a thirteen-year-old minor accused the social
networking site of failing to implement basic safety measures to protect
minors using its services.110 The thirteen-year-old minor had evaded
MySpace age restrictions by claiming that she was eighteen when creating
an account and was later sexually assaulted by a nineteen-year-old she had
met on the site.111 The plaintiff did not allege that MySpace was negligent
in failing to remove her profile, but rather that it had failed to take sufficient
security measures to prevent bad-actor users from preying on minors. 112
The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to impose liability on MySpace because
the minor had violated the site’s terms of service and therefore risked her
own safety by lying about her age and voluntarily posting information to
the website without her parent’s supervision.113
C. Establishing the Limits of Section 230
Most early cases established that § 230 created broad liability protection
for internet intermediaries whose users engaged in some form of
misbehavior. But subsequent cases and legislation have established limits to
its application. Still, courts have generally recognized that any limitations
placed on liability protection must be narrowly tailored to ensure that the
law continues to serve its intended purpose.
1. Copyright
One notable exception to liability protection under § 230 arises in cases
with copyright violations. In fact, subsection (e)(2) specifically states that
the liability protection should not “be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.”114 In 1998, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)115 to address two concerns: (1) that
intermediaries were not adequately addressing copyright violations and (2)
110. 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008).
111. Id. MySpace’s age restrictions at the time required its users to be fourteen to create a
profile. Id.
112. Id. at 420–21.
113. Id. (providing a transcript of a hearing before the district court that indicates the
plaintiff’s concession as to lying, disobeying the website’s requirements, and her parent’s
failure to adequately supervise).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
115. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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that § 230 liability protections removed the incentives for them to address
those violations.116 The DMCA incorporated the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) 117 to create a compromise
that imposed liability against operators who failed to remove offending
content after receiving notice and clarified when operators could be held
liable for copyright violations.118
Under OCILLA, intermediaries or storage providers were immune from
liability for a user’s copyright violations so long as they did not receive a
direct financial benefit from the infringement and complied with requests
for removal of copyrighted material. 119 Though the statute did not require
constant monitoring for violations, it did require intermediaries or storage
providers, on their own initiative, to remove material that a reasonable
person would know infringed on copyrights.120
2. Intermediaries and Illegal Behavior
While the protections for intermediaries have grown to immunize the
young information-sharing industry, courts have found that, many times,
intermediaries cross the line from “service provider” to “content provider.”
The distinction between different types of providers plays an important role
for purposes of liability protection under § 230 because those who develop
the content’s platform can be liable for the underlying illegal statements.121
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC
(“Roommates”) provides an example of a case where a court determined
that a content provider exercised enough control over content to forfeit its
liability protection. 122 Roommates involved a roommate-matching website
that required users to enter demographic information including gender,
sexual orientation, and family situation when creating their profiles. 123
Users were also able to select, via a drop-down menu, their preferences for
the sex and sexual preference of potential roommates. 124 The Fair Housing
Council alleged that these drop-down menus required users to make
116. See generally Carolyn Andrepont, Comment, Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
Copyright Protections for the Digital Age, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. (1999).
117. Pub. L. 105-304, Title II, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2877 (1998).
118. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018).
119. Id. § 512 (c)(1)(B)–(C).
120. See id. § 512 (c)–(d).
121. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
122. See 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–67 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the content at issue is
required to use the platform).
123. Id. at 1165.
124. Id.
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statements and roommate preferences in violation of federal housing
discrimination laws. 125
The district court initially dismissed the case because it found that the
website was an intermediary that enjoyed liability protection under § 230. 126
The Fair Housing Council appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the
district court and held that § 230 did not protect a website in this
circumstance. 127 The court reasoned that an intermediary that “contributes
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct” is not entitled to liability
protection under § 230.128
This distinction between merely allowing users to post content and
actively encouraging illegal behavior has been an issue in multiple cases,
notably including those involving sex trafficking, terrorism, and violence.
However, courts have generally found that § 230 protects intermediaries
from liability (even when state law might attach a tort violation) so long as
the online provider was acting in a conduit capacity. 129 Similarly, § 230
provides protection for intermediaries who engage in good-faith filtering
efforts to remove such content but who may fail in a specific case. 130
Courts have also generally upheld liability protection for advertisements
that might include questionable or even illegal activities, such as
prostitution, provided that the intermediary did not encourage the activity or
engage in the drafting or placement of the advertisement beyond the
financial transaction. 131 In recent cases, such as those against the website
Backpage.com, more questions have been raised about how far liability
protection extends when an intermediary assists with or modifies the
wording of ads as part of the approval process. 132
125. Id.
126. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 0309386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004).
127. Fair Hous., 521 F.3d at 1170.
128. Id. at 1168. The case was then remanded back to the lower court, which actually
found Roommates.com’s activity violated the FHA and FEHA, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed and held that the website won the case on the merits. Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012).
129. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding § 230
barred the plaintiff’s state law negligence claim, arising from the unauthorized sharing of
nude photographs of the plaintiff on defendant’s site).
130. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
131. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
132. See Fla. Abolitionist v. Backpage.com LLC, No: 6:17-cv-orl-28TBS, 2018 WL
1587477, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2018); Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, No. 1711069-LTS, 2018 WL 1542056, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 2018).
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In general, federal prosecutors have been able to secure convictions for
intermediaries that engage in an illegal activity or transaction, as § 230
liability protection does not cover such scenarios. For example, as Cary
Glynn details in describing a potential criminal case against Backpage.com
under an earlier version of § 230, 133 prosecutors alleged that MyRedbook
accepted payments to feature certain ads, despite knowing that prostitution
was likely to be illegal in the jurisdiction and that the ads were being used
to facilitate sex with minors, and failed to respond to law enforcement
requests.134 Similarly, the government indicted the owner of the website
RentBoy after an investigation discovered that website employees reviewed
ads and told advertisers how to rephrase them so as to avoid mentioning
sexual acts or drawing the attention of law enforcement.135
D. Law, Policy, and Changes to Section 230
The movement to modify or repeal § 230 has grown over the years as
internet-based companies have transformed from small startups to some of
the largest companies in the world. Though it closely tracked the
development of common law that culminated in the Cubby decision, § 230
liability protection is often characterized as a radical departure from
traditional publication law.136 According to lawyer Joshua M. Masur, § 230
is “an exception to the rule of common-law liability for republication.” 137
As UNC law professor David S. Ardia put it, § 230’s creation “upended a
set of principles enshrined in common law doctrines that had been
developed over decades, if not centuries, in cases involving offline
intermediaries. [I]t halted judicial attempts to adapt the common law to the

133. Cary Glynn, The DoJ’s Busts of MyRedbook and Rentboy Show How Backpage
Might Be Prosecuted, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2017), https://blog.
ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/the-dojs-busts-of-myredbook-rentboy-show-howbackpage-might-be-prosecuted-guest-blog-post.htm.
134. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum 2–3, United States v. Omuro, No. 3:14-cr00336 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2015).
135. Glynn, supra note 133.
136. See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 7, at 411; Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The
Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV.
137, 137–38 (2008) (characterizing § 230 as a provision “alter[ing] centuries of commonlaw precedent [in order] to grant the owners of such private online forums unprecedented
immunity from liability for defamation and related torts committed by third-party users”)
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); see also Masnick, supra note 7 (quoting House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi characterizing § 230 as “a gift” to tech companies).
137. Joshua M. Masur, A Most Uncommon Carrier: Online Service Provider Immunity
Against Defamation Claims in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 40 JURIMETRICS 217, 218 (2000).
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changing technology.”138 As another advocate for modifying the current
system argued, § 230 provides internet intermediaries with “special
treatment” that makes publishing “harassing, destructive content . . .
profitable.”139
Journalists, legal scholars, and advocates have suggested that § 230 has
contributed to the spread of conspiracy theories, 140 protected child
predators,141 enabled powerful online platforms to evade local laws, 142 and
favored a system that disproportionately censors conservative
viewpoints.143 Law professor Ann Bartow similarly stated that large internet
platforms are able to “launder the proceeds of hate speech, and happily cash
the checks” because of their protection from liability.144 In August 2018,
even Senator Ron Wyden, who drafted § 230 while serving in the House of
Representatives, wrote that technology companies’ “ineptitude” in filtering
indecent content is undermining congressional faith in the law. 145 This
frustration with § 230 even seems to have penetrated the courts.146

138. Ardia, supra note 7, at 411.
139. Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 29,
2015, 2:31 PM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-thisliability-shield/; see also Ann Bartow, Section 230 Keeps Platforms for Defamation and
Threats Highly Profitable, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017, 1:10 AM), https://www.law.
com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/section-230-keeps-platforms-for-defamationand-threats-highly-profitable/?slreturn=20181030153646.
140. Chu, supra note 139.
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Stedman, Comment, MySpace, but Whose Responsibility?
Liability of Social-Networking Websites When Offline Sexual Assault of Minors Follows
Online Interaction, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 363, 387–90 (2007) (discussing the CDA in
the context of making a proximate cause argument more difficult).
142. See Christopher Zara, The Most Important Law in Tech Has a Problem, WIRED (Jan.
3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/01/the-most-important-law-in-tech-has-aproblem/.
143. Sullivan, supra note 8 (“Many Republicans believe that Silicon Valley tech
companies are determined to suppress conservative content on their platforms.”); see also
James Altschul, It’s Time for Congress to Treat Twitter as a Publisher, FEDERALIST (Nov.
29, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/time-congress-treat-twitter-publisher/.
144. Ann Bartow, Online Harassment, Profit Seeking, and Section 230, 95 B.U. L. REV.
ANNEX 101, 102 (2015) [hereinafter Bartow, Online Harassment].
145. Ron Wyden, The Consequences of Indecency, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 23, 2018, 1:15
PM CDT), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/23/the-consequences-of-indecency/.
146. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five
Best), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/
2017/01/ten-worst-section-230-rulings-of-2016-plus-the-five-best.htm (listing cases that
undermine earlier conceptions of § 230 protection).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020

658

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:635

Both legislative action and political rhetoric suggest that the movement
to reform or repeal § 230 is gaining traction. In 2018, Congress passed the
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA),
which amended § 230 to impose liability against intermediaries when users
conduct sex trafficking activity on their platforms. 147 Yet many civil-society
advocates and lawmakers would like to go further, suggesting similar
carve-outs for societal ills like opioid sales 148 and hate speech. 149 For
instance, legal scholar Ann Bartow has called for reforming § 230 by
introducing a conditional liability protection that more closely resembles
the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown system. 150
But even before the creation of § 230, many courts had shifted away
from the strict liability regime and toward conduit liability protections and
fault-based requirements. 151 In many circumstances, even a distributor that
had known of the tortious material would have been immune from liability
because the social and judicial norms favoring practicable moderation
practices and free speech had eroded the traditional liability standards. 152 In
effect, § 230 codified the conduit liability protection that courts were
applying to traditional media distributors—including some cases after
1996.153
As one federal district court noted in 1994, “[p]rotection for
republication . . . has not been rigorously circumscribed within the wire
service context” and covers several types of media intermediaries that
147. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-164, § 3 (2018).
148. Samantha Cole, Senator Suggests the Internet Needs a FOSTA/SESTA for Drug
Trafficking, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 5, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/8xbwvp/joe-manchin-fosta-sesta-law-for-drug-trafficking-senate-intelligencecommittee-hearing. Many conservatives, for instance, would like to remove the intermediary
liability because of perceived unfair censoring of conservatives. Sullivan, supra note 8.
149. See Wyden, supra note 145 (“There are real consequences to social media hosting
radically indecent speech, and those consequences are looming.”).
150. Bartow, Online Harassment, supra note 144, at 102–03.
151. A similar trend can be observed in copyright. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See generally
Goold, supra note 13. But see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993) (finding that an online bulletin board operator is liable for direct copyright
infringement when users upload copyrighted images, and the operator fails to remove the
images).
152. See also Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Note, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications
Decency Act and the Common Law of Defamation: A Convergence Thesis, 20 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 195, 199 (2018).
153. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999).
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republish content.154 And in its 1999 Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.
decision, the New York Court of Appeals expressly classified an internet
bulletin board operator as a common-law conduit.155 The court still applied
the “conduit designation,” even though the bulletin board operator “reserves
for itself broad editorial discretion to screen its bulletin board messages”
and occasionally exercises that discretion. 156 The court explained that even
if Prodigy had prohibited “certain vulgarities” from bulletin board
messages, it would have retained its “passive character” in the other posts
that it did not censor and would not been obligated to “guarantee the
content of” the messages it did not edit.157
Lunney resembled the internet intermediary protection found in Cubby,
which was decided eight years earlier, and was part of the legal trend of
courts creating protective rules for media intermediaries. Despite tens of
millions of Americans interacting online in the mid-1990s,158 we are aware
of no case from 1991 to 1996—save Stratton Oakmont—where an online
distributor was liable for republishing a user’s tortious material. 159 Stratton
Oakmont was therefore an anomaly, not a development of common law. 160
The succession of Cubby, the broadcast cases like Auvil, and Lunney in
the 1990s suggests that the passage of § 230 simply accelerated the
expansion of liability protection for online content distributors that
otherwise would have been established by common law, custom, and state
legislatures. Consistent with this theory, a 2010 study by David S. Ardia
found that most § 230 cases would have arrived at the same outcome
regarding whether the distributor was liable under common law.161 As
Ardia states in a discussion of his empirical work, “many of the
154. Nicholson v. Promoters on Listings, 159 F.R.D. 343, 356 (D. Mass. 1994) (citing
broadcaster, internet, and newspaper republication cases).
155. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541–42 (holding that an internet service provider and bulletin
board operator, “like a telephone company, is merely a conduit”).
156. Id. at 542.
157. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting the lower court decision).
158. Kara Swisher, Internet’s Reach in Society Grows, Survey Finds, WASH. POST, Oct.
31, 1995, at A1 (describing a Nielsen poll finding thirty-seven million internet users in the
United States and Canada).
159. At least some courts already viewed Cubby as establishing persuasive precedent that
an internet intermediary could not be held strictly liable for publishing defamatory
statements. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1367 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
160. See Matthew C. Siderits, Comment, Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby,
Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 79 MARQ. L. REV.
1065, 1079–80 (1996).
161. Ardia, supra note 7, at 480.
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intermediaries that invoked section 230 likely would not have faced
eventual liability under the common law because they lacked knowledge of
and editorial control over the third-party content at issue in the cases.” 162
Still, § 230 had a salutary effect at a critical time. A 2019 report by
Engine, 163 a technology startup advocacy group, suggested that without §
230, the costs of defending against litigation might be ruinous for many
startups, even if they eventually win the case. 164 According to the in-house
and external attorneys consulted for the report, responding to a usergenerated content liability claim through a motion to dismiss alone could
cost $15,000 to $80,000.165 And defending a case through discovery could
cost a firm anywhere from $100,000 to more than half a million dollars.166
As Ardia points out, § 230’s liability protection gave online providers
that made decisions regarding third-party content a “breathing space” and
legal certainty after Stratton Oakmont derailed the Cubby and conduit
liability trend.167 A period of uncertainty—and massive “collateral
censorship”—would have ensued because online providers do not know in
advance where their users are located. Any provider with users in New
York would have been potentially subject to liability for users’ posts under
the Stratton Oakmont decision. § 230 precluded that turn of events.
In short, wholesale changes to § 230’s publisher liability regime could
create a Stratton Oakmont-like situation where online providers feel
compelled to comply with the strictest state trial court decision to avoid
exposing themselves to liability for user content. In the long term, for the
reasons discussed above, courts likely would have extended conduit
liability-like protections to online providers. However, because the
traditional view is that the “conduit” designation only applies to common
carrier or public utility services 168 and online services do not fall under
162. Id.
163. About Engine, ENGINE, https://www.engine.is/about-engine (last visited Dec. 12,
2019) (“Engine is a policy, advocacy, and research organization supporting startups as an
engine for economic growth.”).
164. ENGINE, SECTION 230: COST REPORT (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
571681753c44d835a440c8b5/t/5c8168cae5e5f04b9a30e84e/1551984843007/Engine_Primer
_230cost2019.pdf.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Ardia, supra note 7, at 480 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
168. Conduit liability protection typically referred to public utilities. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS: PROVIDING MEANS OF PUBLICATION § 612 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
A public utility under a duty to transmit messages is privileged to do so, even
though it knows the message to be false and defamatory, unless
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either category, the amount of time it would have taken for that process to
occur likely would have exacerbated online content providers’ concerns and
thus resulted in fear-based overcompliance.
III. The Next Era of Publishing and Curation
Section 230 minimized the cost of engaging in content distribution and
removed some of the online content distributors’ possible fears about
making moderation part of their business model. It also provides certainty
that allows online content distributors to conduct their business without the
risk of protracted litigation. While an examination of the legal precedent
leading up to the enactment of § 230 suggests that courts would likely
establish a similar liability regime in common law, repealing § 230 today
would impose significant costs during the resulting transition period.
If § 230 is modified to make online intermediaries liable for more types
of user-generated content, any such transition should be narrowly tailored
and focused on cases where (1) there is general agreement that the content
at issue has minimal speech value, (2) where basic software programs or
nonexpert curators can easily identify the content as impermissible, and (3)
dedicated content removal efforts would have a limited impact on
legitimate speech. The massive amount of internet content to be screened,
however, means that notice liability only seems effective under certain,
narrow circumstances.
A. Curation Standards and User-Generated Content Communities Under
Liability Protection
Section 230 provided breathing room that encouraged intermediaries to
develop a wide range of standards for best practices in curation and
moderation.169 In the United States, this statutory regime has allowed norms
to develop without the need for regulatory enforcement and has also
allowed communities to determine for themselves what is and is not
appropriate.170 In many instances, online communities set their own rules.
(a) the sender of the message is not privileged to send it, and
(b) the agent who transmits the message knows or has reason to know that the
sender is not privileged to publish it.
Id. § 612(2).
169. See Jason Koebler & Joseph Cox, The Impossible Job: Inside Facebook’s Struggle
to Moderate Two Billion People, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 23, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xwk9zd/how-facebook-content-moderation-works.
170. See Tarleton Gillespie, How Social Networks Set the Limits of What We Can Say
Online, WIRED (June 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-social-
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However marginal the number of those completely self-governed
communities, they would likely not exist without § 230 because these
communities would not have had the opportunity to develop under a stricter
regime, nor would they be able to afford to comply with regulation that
mandates employing expensive content moderation algorithms. Although §
230 allows both large and small platforms to set their content moderation
standards, it does not place a judgment on whether those standards are good
or bad.
Critics of § 230 allege that intermediaries that curate or moderate content
should forfeit liability protection like the defendant in Stratton Oakmont.
For example, conservative critics have argued that § 230 requires a degree
of neutrality in implementing these moderation decisions. 171 Yet § 230 was
never about neutrality. As Senator Wyden, one of the original authors,
stated in an interview, “Section 230 is not about neutrality. Period. Full
stop.”172
Instead of focusing on neutrality, courts have distinguished between
mere moderation decisions and cases where intermediaries exercise more
control by editing content or encouraging certain behavior. This includes
cases where the websites encouraged behavior that could violate existing
laws. For example, in Roommates, when the website created content that
appeared to violate the Fair Housing Act’s antidiscrimination policy, the
Ninth Circuit found that the site was not entitled to § 230 protection. 173
Similarly, before the enactment of FOSTA and the sex trafficking exception
from § 230 liability protection, prosecutors indicted top officials from
Backpage.com for conspiracy, facilitating prostitution, and money
laundering after they failed to take appropriate steps to prevent advertisers
networks-set-the-limits-of-what-we-can-say-online/; Charlie Warzel, “A Honey Pot for
Assholes”: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year Failure to Stop Harassment, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 11,
2016, 8:43 AM ET), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholesinside-twitters-10-year-failure-to-s?utm_term=.gipx7zY0E#.ubRQYWjyA.
171. See, e.g., Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: This Is Ted Cruz’s Playbook to
Crack Down on Big Tech for Alleged Anti-conservative Bias, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-technology202/2019/04/11/the-technology-202-this-is-ted-cruz-s-playbook-to-crack-down-on-big-techfor-alleged-anti-conservative-bias/5cae7278a7a0a475985bd3d3/?utm_term=.ec797e19ad22.
172. Emily Stewart, Ron Wyden Wrote the Law That Built the Internet. He Still Stands by
It—and Everything It’s Brought with It, VOX RECODE (May 16, 2019, 9:50 AM EDT),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/16/18626779/ron-wyden-section-230-facebookregulations-neutrality.
173. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1174–76 (9th Cir. 2008).
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from using their website to commit crimes.174 This distinction between
mere moderation and more active engagement has allowed law enforcement
to punish bad actors while enabling most intermediaries to make a wide
variety of content moderation decisions.
In fact, § 230 encourages intermediaries to develop and enforce their
own standards through a Good Samaritan safe harbor provision and has
become essential for the growth of the wide variety of services relying on
user-generated content. This Good Samaritan175 safe harbor is core to a
wide variety of platforms beyond social media by allowing them to make
choices regarding content moderation without constant concerns of
litigation and has been illustrated in the variety of platforms that have been
the subject of cases involving § 230, including review sites, internet and
mobile service providers, and search engines. 176 Rather than discouraging
intermediaries from engaging in content moderation, § 230 has provided a
way for each individual intermediary to select curation norms without fear
that an occasional mistake might expose the company to excessive
liability.177
Allowing intermediaries to develop their own standards has also allowed
specialized communities to decide whether to restrict or allow content.
Communities have developed a variety of norms that depend on their users’
acceptance of various content, and those norms can vary even within
platforms as they emerge from interaction both within and between
communities on the platforms. 178 For example, as a study of Reddit
communities noted, while some universal norms apply to moderation across

174. Tom Jackman & Mark Berman, Top Officials at Backpage.com Indicted After
Classifieds Site Taken Offline, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2018, 5:12 PM CDT), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/top-officials-at-backpagecom-indicted-afterclassifieds-site-taken-offline/2018/04/09/0b646f36-39db-11e8-9c0a85d477d9a226_story.html?utm_term=.227623710afd.
175. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
176. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th
Cir. 2009) (involving a review site); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)
(involving a mobile and ISP provider); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (involving a search engine).
177. See How Social-Media Platforms Dispense Justice, ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/06/how-social-media-platforms-dispensejustice.
178. See Eshwar Chandrasekharan et al., The Internet’s Hidden Rules: An Empirical
Study of Reddit Norm Violations at Micro, Meso, and Macro Scales, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 32:1 (2018), http://eegilbert.org/papers/
cscw18-chand-norms.pdf.
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the entire online community, individual subreddits 179 and related groups of
subreddits developed more specific norms.180
As it was written, § 230 encouraged the development of an environment
where such diversity of options was possible. Even absent strict regulation,
most platforms prefer to exclude obscene and graphic material as a way to
grow their user bases and make it easier to cultivate relationships with
potential advertisers or other financial supporters.181 Yet individual
platforms and even communities within these platforms may still arrive at
different decisions on contentious content, including decisions about what
might be considered harassment or hate speech, or what content deserves a
warning. 182 Additionally, particularly for parental controls, a wide range of
options—from barely monitoring to highly restrictive—has developed both
by individual platforms and ISPs as well as third party services to provide
users with a variety of methods for choosing which content to block. 183
The organic evolution of terms of service and norms within online
communities, as opposed to top-down regulation, has enabled a wide
variety of online communities to develop. Content moderation decisions
often affect the formation of these communities and the interactions of their
users.184 In general, many active communities create a global marketplace
for both goods and ideas that would be unimaginable without an open
internet. Even before the rise of social media, online communities that were
organized by shared interests such as professional groups, hobbies, and
sports teams arose and maintained (or expanded) existing local
communities.185 These self-organizing groups and communities may
become increasingly insular as people tend to interact with like-minded

179. Id. at 32:2.
180. Id.
181. See Tarleton Gillespie, Regulation of and by Platforms, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL MEDIA 254, 262 (Jean Burgess et al. eds., 2017).
182. See Chandrasekharan et al., supra note 178, at 32:16–32:21.
183. See Jennifer Huddleston, Technology Is Not Your Parent: But Innovation Can Be a
Parent’s Best Friend, MEDIUM: PLAIN TEXT (Jan. 16, 2018), https://readplaintext.com/
technology-is-not-your-parent-4fc6d2df99ff.
184. See Yuqing Ren & Robert E. Kraut, A Simulation for Designing Online
Community: Member Motivation, Contribution, and Discussion Moderation 21–24 (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b15b/603c3f4460439a7f6f868ad
f868bad4929fb.pdf.
185. Jenny Preece et al., History of Online Communities, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMMUNITY 1023 (Karen Christensen & David Levinson eds., 2003).
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individuals and consume information and advertisements that reinforce the
community’s pre-existing beliefs.186
Yet the internet has generally been a powerful force for providing a
global platform that has low barriers to entry and can empower
marginalized individuals to become involved in commerce or speech in
ways they traditionally could not. For example, microwork platforms 187—
websites that unite a large number of individuals who each complete small,
relatively simple task—allow individuals who were previously excluded
from the workforce to participate. 188 Similarly, online platforms have
amplified voices in social movements that might have otherwise gone
unheard.189
In summary, § 230 immunizes online intermediaries from liability for
user-generated content, regardless of their size. Therefore, any changes that
limits liability protection will impose compliance costs on all
intermediaries. Any such change should explicitly recognize those social
costs as well as the advantage it will create for larger firms with the
resources to comply. No matter how well intended any such change may be,
it must account for the chilling effect on innovation by startups and small
firms, as well as the artificial barriers to entry that will entrench incumbent
firms.
B. Notice Liability for Online Distributors
When weighing the proper level and scope of regulation, courts and
legislatures must balance competing concerns between what liability is
appropriate and what liability is feasible. They also must consider the
potential unintended consequences of what such regimes may result in,
including both over action and under action.

186. See Dimitar Nikolov et al., Measuring Online Social Bubbles, PEERJ COMPUTER SCI.
(Dec. 2, 2015), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-38/.
187. See, e.g., AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com (last visited Jan. 8,
2020) (advertising that individuals and businesses can utilize Amazon’s platform to
“outsource their processes and jobs to a distributed workforce who can perform these tasks
virtually”).
188. See Empowering Women Through the Internet, INT’L DEV. RES. CTR., https://www.
itu.int/en/Lists/consultationOct2017/Attachments/56/Empowering%20women%20through%
20the%20Internet_Jan2018.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
189. See David Meek, YouTube and Social Movements: A Phenomenological Analysis of
Participation, Events, and Cyberplace, 44 ANTIPODE 1429, 1436–43 (2012) (discussing one
example of the use and impact of social media on social movements via analysis of Invisible
Children).
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Section 230 anticipated the Supreme Court’s liability maxim in
Bartnicki v. Vopper, a 2001 decision about (offline) intermediary liability:
“The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an
appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.”190
Legislative changes to intermediary liability should keep that maxim in
mind, and any modifications to § 230 must account for the huge amount of
content that social media and online distributors transmit. Every minute,
more than 87,500 tweets and 2.1 million snaps191 are sent, and over 3.8
million searches are conducted.192 As the Zeran court noted, “liability upon
notice has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech. . . . Because
service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive
simply to remove messages upon notification . . . .”193 Given the scale and
increasing number of products that rely on user-generated content, such as
review sites and messaging services, content moderation at scale remains an
incredible challenge for platforms—even as artificial intelligence improves
and companies hire more content moderators.194
1. When Notice Liability Succeeds
Section 230 reform proposals would create more categories for which
intermediaries are subject to notice liability. 195 But exposing intermediaries
to additional notice liability undermines the purposes of § 230. As the
Zeran court recognized, “[L]iability upon notice reinforces service
providers’ incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.” 196
However, notice liability or automated or semi-automated rejection of
190. 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001).
191. The colloquial term for photos or videos sent via SnapChat.
192. Jeff Desjardis, What Happens in an Internet Minute in 2019?, VISUAL CAPITALIST
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/what-happens-in-an-internet-minute-in2019/.
193. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
194. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th
Cir. 2009) (involving a review site); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003)
(involving a mobile and ISP provider); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (involving a search engine); see also Jacob Parker Black, Note, Facebook and the
Future of Fair Housing Online, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 701, 717–18 (2020) (proposing that the
implementation of both “input filtration” and “ex-post analysis” is the most effective and
practical solution for moderating internet speech).
195. See Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need
Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597 (2019) (proposing notice liability for
Internet platforms for torts online).
196. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
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antisocial content could be effective in some circumstances: (1) where there
is a social consensus that the content in question has minimal speech value,
(2) where basic software programs or nonexpert curators can easily identify
the content as impermissible, and (3) dedicated removal efforts result in
limited collateral censorship.
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Bartnicki, “third party” speech can
be suppressed when “the speech at issue is considered of minimal value.” 197
Section 230 implies this limitation since it does not protect content that is
obscene or otherwise violates criminal law. 198 In some cases, notice liability
for this antisocial content has been effected by statute199 and supplemented
through an industry-wide best practice or unified stance.200
Perhaps the best illustration of censoring minimally valuable speech has
been the identification and removal of clearly antisocial content: child
pornography and similar child abuse. As the Supreme Court noted in New
York v. Ferber, “[t]he value of permitting live performances and
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”201 As a result, intermediaries have
generally been willing to cooperate with federal investigations of such
material. 202 This willingness stems not only from the establishment of

197. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 530 n.13 (2001) (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495
U.S. 103, 110 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982)).
198. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-90).
199. See, e.g., id. § 230(e).
200. There is widespread use by social media sites and websites to automatically filter
and report illegal child abuse images, for instance, with use of Microsoft’s PhotoDNA
database. See PhotoDNA, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna (last
visited Jan. 9, 2020). There are also informal best practices by social media companies to
remove certain violent, livestreamed content. See, e.g., Social Media Platforms Say They Are
Taking Action to Remove Christchurch Shooting Content, CNA (Mar. 15, 2019, 7:28 PM),
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/technology/social-media-platforms-say-they-aretaking-action-to-remove-11348974.
201. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762.
202. See Weakening Section 230 Won’t Prevent Sex Trafficking, TECHFREEDOM (Aug.
3, 2017), http://techfreedom.org/weakening-section-230-wont-prevent-sex-trafficking/
(discussing that the safe harbor provision incentivizes the platform operators’ active
involvement in monitoring for illegal activity); see also Guidelines for Law Enforcement,
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-law-enforcement-support#
16.5 (last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (illustrating how one company handles law enforcement
takedown requests).
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potential criminal liability but also from intermediaries’ general agreement
about what material is a violation and why the violation is harmful.203
Not only has notice liability assisted in the removal of such detrimental
material, but it has also created a market for new screening software that
automatically identifies and removes that material.204 The general
acknowledgment of this harm has also encouraged intermediaries to share
technologies and research. 205 The collateral censorship from these image
removals does not appear to suppress much legitimate, high-value speech.
2. When Notice Liability Is Less Successful
For other categories of content like hate speech and cyberbullying, the
consensus on what constitutes content that should be subject to removal is
less clear, and law enforcement takedown requirements could limit
legitimate and protected speech. Defamation and other intentional torts are
not always easy to identify or prove, even by courts considering the
issues.206 This lack of consensus favors approaches that allow a diverse
market for content moderation.
While notice liability has succeeded in reducing images of child
pornography and abuse, it has produced mixed results for copyright and
other intellectual property violations. Notably, the DMCA has struggled
with numerous false positives—falsely characterizing content as violating a
copyright when it does not—and easy-to-navigate loopholes that prevent
intermediaries from identifying all potentially infringing material. 207 There
are several reasons why the DMCA has been less successful in changing
user or intermediary behavior for content that may infringe on copyrights
than the exception to § 230 liability protection for child pornography.
First, copyright violations are often more difficult to identify. As a result,
basic software and nonexpert moderators have a hard time flagging and
screening copyright violations with a high degree of reliability. For
example, fan videos and fanfiction that involve characters and images from
203. See Jemima Kiss, How Microsoft, Google and ISPs Aim to Halt Child Abuse
Images, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:05 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2013/nov/18/microsoft-google-summit-halt-child-abuse-images.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 530–31
(1959) (“Whether a statement is defamatory is rarely clear. Whether such a statement is
actionably libelous is an even more complex question . . . .”).
207. See Brad Stone, The Inexact Science Behind D.M.C.A. Takedown Notices, N.Y.
TIMES BITS (June 5, 2008, 11:18 AM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/theinexact-science-behind-dmca-takedown-notices/.
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copyrighted material are typically not considered violations, but the same
clips or quotes may violate copyrights in other contexts. 208 Parodies and
creative uses may also change what is or is not a violation but require
greater consideration of context to determine whether or not such uses
constitute a violation. 209
Second, notice liability encourages intermediaries to adopt an “act first,
question second” approach that exacerbates the potential for abuse and false
positives when no harm has actually occurred. For example, YouTube has
removed a singer’s own concert video based on DMCA complaints 210 and
removed a video of a Star Wars clip without John Williams’s score for
violating the score’s copyright by not having it there. 211 While these
examples may seem extreme, in 13.3% of takedown requests in a sample,
the underlying infringing content cannot be located, and for another 6%, the
allegedly infringed work cannot be identified. 212
Third, the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown requirements establish barriers
to entry for new competitors because notices from others, by their nature,
require repeated investigation. A small company that publishes usergenerated content but has limited resources must dedicate at least some of
its staff to responding to takedown requests even though they may turn out
to be false. But by failing to remove allegedly infringing material, a
company would risk exposing itself to crippling liability.
Finally, notice liability ignores the potential benefits of modifying and
reproducing copyrighted material, such as parody and fair use. Overbroad
208. See generally Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and
Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2009).
209. Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing
Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of Transformative Video, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 317, 334–38 (2007) (describing the difficulty in distinguishing works considered to be
parody, which are classified as transformative and therefore do not infringe on prior
copyrights, and works that are considered to be satire, which are presumptively nontransformative and may infringe on prior copyrights).
210. Mike Masnick, YouTube Takes Down Ariana Grande’s Manchester Benefit Concert
on Copyright Grounds, TECHDIRT (June 7, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20170606/17500637534/youtube-takes-down-ariana-grandes-manchester-benefitconcert-copyright-grounds.shtml.
211. Tim Cushing, Warner/Chappell Issues Copyright Claim Over YouTube Video
Deliberately Containing None of Its Music, TECHDIRT (Aug. 10, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20170810/10140137975/warner-chappell-issues-copyright-claimover-youtube-video-deliberately-containing-none-music.shtml.
212. Jennifer M. Urban et. al, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice 93–94 (Univ.
of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 27556282017, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628.
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DMCA takedown requests limit the set of ideas that can be spread without
necessarily improving the veracity or quality of published material as a
whole by creating strict limitations for the sharing of copyrighted
material. 213 The history of the DMCA illustrates that such increased liability
creates two broad categories of costs: (1) enforcement costs and (2) social
and litigation costs associated with false positives. 214
Because of these looming costs, notice liability should be limited to a
clearly defined set of material that is egregiously offensive. Any such
change to the § 230 liability regime must consider the inevitable difficulties
and social costs that false positives will create and avoid expanding to
content that by its nature resists clear, technical characterization. The
significant number of deficient takedown notices generated under the
DMCA should serve as a cautionary tale when considering expanding
notice liability to other areas.
3. Potential Applications Based on This Framework
With the recognition of many of these limitations in mind and the
potential of emerging consensus around identifiable harmful content in
mind, we consider “revenge porn” as one area where notice liability may
prove more effective and practicable than the DMCA’s imperfect noticeand-takedown provisions—and where there is sufficient agreement within
most internet communities about the harm or potential for harm. According
to the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, forty-six states and the District of
Columbia have laws concerning revenge porn—the nonconsensual
distribution of another individual’s sexually explicit images.215 Some
platforms—including Google, Microsoft, Reddit, and Twitter—already
have policies to remove such content on request or recognize that such
content violates the site’s terms of service. 216 These policies illustrate an
213. See generally Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research,
18 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 501, 503 (2003) (discussing whether “academic encryption
researchers should reasonably fear liability under the DMCA for certain types of research”).
214. Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 319, 320–22 (2013).
215. 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R.
INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
216. See Jacqueline Beauchere, ‘Revenge Porn’: Putting Victims Back in Control,
MICROSOFT ON ISSUES (July 22, 2015), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/07/
22/revenge-porn-putting-victims-back-in-control/; Jennifer Golbeck, Google to Remove
Revenge Porn from Search Results, SLATE (June 19, 2015, 3:12 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2015/06/google-announces-plan-to-remove-revenge-porn-fromsearch-results.html; Amanda Hess, Reddit Has Banned Revenge Porn. Sort Of., SLATE (Feb.
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emerging understanding that the potential harm of such content outweighs
its speech value.
Laws that criminalize revenge porn could face First Amendment speech
challenges if they are overbroad and thus criminalize legitimate speech. 217
As a result, imposing notice liability might allow intermediaries to limit
harmful and harassing content while protecting legitimate First Amendment
speech. By only requiring removal upon notice, any such change to § 230’s
regime would allow harmed individuals to request a takedown of
information that was shared without consent, much like for a copyright
violation. As in the case of copyright violations under the DMCA, these
requests would be subject to a review process or a proscribed method for
appealing a decision to remove the content. But in this case, false positives
seem less problematic because the value of the speech restricted is
generally considered low, while the risk of harm from nonconsensual
distribution is patent.
If notice liability were applied to revenge porn, safe harbor provisions
should also be created to limit liability when it is not reasonable for a
platform to keep pace with a novel violation or the quantity of content.
Additionally, encouraging intermediaries to develop tools that identify and
flag such content (like tools that identify and remove child pornography)
should accompany laws implementing this liability to make it feasible for
intermediaries to protect themselves from increased liability, regardless of
their size.
Notice liability is successful when intermediaries can employ a
reasonable screening mechanism that can clearly identify a harm and user
content clearly violates an established standard. Unfortunately, there are
few such generally-agreed-upon norms. Despite the narrow circumstances
under which notice liability is successful, proposals to amend § 230 by
imposing notice liability requirements should be limited to a narrow set of
content that is widely recognized as offensive and harmful, like child
pornography.
25, 2015, 11:36 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/reddit-bans-revenge-pornvictims-advocates-and-the-aclu-react-to-the-new-rule-against-nonconsensual-porn.html; Lily
Hay Newman, Twitter Moves to Prohibit Revenge Porn, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2015, 7:09 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2015/03/twitter-updates-its-privacy-policy-against-revengeporn-and-rep-katherine-clark-discusses-online-harassment.html.
217. See, e.g., Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. Ct.
App. May 16, 2018) (finding that Texas’s revenge porn law was overly broad and violated
the First Amendment); see also Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First
Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 661–72 (2016).
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Despite the benefits of this system, any notice liability regime can invite
opportunistic use of notice. 218 Specifically, it is foreseeable that politically
controversial speech and business product reviews would be the most likely
targets in notice liability regimes due to the proprietary and social gains
associated with successful messaging. 219 Therefore, exceptions to § 230 and
conduit liability should be designed with the expectation that takedown
notices will be abused. Ultimately, when making these determinations,
lawmakers must carefully weigh the harm to individuals, the efficacy of a
notice liability regime for the type of content at issue, the risk and extent of
collateral censorship, and the culpability of the online intermediary.
Conclusion
The § 230 reform movement is growing, and many reform arguments
complain that online intermediaries receive a special dispensation regarding
publisher liability. However, publisher liability is more complicated than §
230’s reformers’ characterizations. Starting in 1933—and for six
subsequent decades—courts gradually chipped away the regime of strict
liability for publishers and content distributors. They did so based on the
practical difficulties of requiring all intermediaries to screen all media
content for potentially tortious material and unnecessary restrictions on
First Amendment-protected speech. Culminating with the decision in
Cubby, courts eventually established that mass media distributors warranted
extensive liability protections, including protection for conduit liability.
When the anomalous 1995 Stratton Oakmont decision was released,
Congress swiftly resolved the dissonance by enacting section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act in 1996. Section 230 codified earlier
precedent and established a regime of liability protection for online content
distributors at a time when internet firms had grown to reach audiences of
tens of millions of people. Reformers’ arguments gained urgency in recent
years; Congress gave the reform effort traction when it passed FOSTA in
2018. By amending § 230 to impose liability against intermediaries when
users conduct sex trafficking activity on their platforms, Congress signaled
that other categories of anti-social content might also properly be excluded
from § 230’s broad liability protection.

218. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 86 n.238
(2006).
219. See Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, supra note 6, at 2038.
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But while reformers may interpret FOSTA as signaling a departure from
§ 230’s publisher liability scheme, anti-social content should only be
excluded in narrow circumstances where widely available software and
nonexpert content moderators can clearly identify content that may be
subject to removal. Pragmatic and First Amendment concerns that informed
decades of publisher and conduit liability cases are still relevant to the
ongoing debate about content moderation, and any debate surrounding the
future of § 230 should be informed by these precedents.
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